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Abstract
We study perfect information games with an innite horizon played
by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes in-
nitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asyn-
chronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with
overlapping generations of players, and canonical non-cooperative mod-
els of bargaining.
We consider two restrictions on equilibria. An equilibrium is puri-
able if close by behavior is consistent with equilibrium when agents'
payos at each node are perturbed additively and independently. An
equilibrium has bounded memory if there exists K such that at most
one player's strategy depends on what happened more than K periods
earlier. We show that only Markovian equilibria have bounded mem-
ory and are puriable. Thus if a game has at most one long run player,
all puriable equilibria are Markovian.
1 Introduction
Markov equilibria are widely used in the applied analysis of dynamic games,
in elds ranging from industrial organization1 to political economy.2 Their




1See Maskin and Tirole (1987, 1988a,b), and Ericson and Pakes (1995).
2See Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).
3See Due, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McClennan (1994) and Maskin and Tirole
(2001) for reviews of these arguments.
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However principled reasons for restricting attention to Markov equilibria are
limited in the literature.4
This paper provides a foundation for Markov strategies for dynamic
games with perfect information that rests on two assumptions. First, we
make the restriction that all players (except possibly one) must use bounded
recall strategies, i.e., strategies that do not depend on the innite past. Sec-
ond, we require equilibrium strategies to be \puriable," i.e., to also con-
stitute an equilibrium of a perturbed game with independent private payo
perturbations in the sense of Harsanyi (1973). Our main result is that
Markov equilibria are the only equilibria which are bounded and puriable.
The puriability requirement re
ects the view that our models are only
an approximation of reality, and there is always some private payo informa-
tion. We make the modest requirement that there must be some continuous
perturbation such that the equilibrium survives. The boundedness require-
ment is of interest for two distinct reasons. First, in many contexts, it is
natural to assume that there do not exist two players who can observe the
innite past: consider, for example, games between a long run player and
a sequence of short run players or in games with overlapping generations
players. Second, strategies that depend on what happens in the arbitrarily
distant past do not seem very robust to memory problems and/or noisy in-
formation. While we do not formally model this justication for focussing on
bounded memory strategy proles, we believe it may make them interesting
objects of study.5
Our argument exploits special features of the games we study: only one
player moves at a time and there is perfect information. Perfect information
and the purifying payo perturbations imply that if a player conditions upon
a past (payo irrelevant) event at date t, then some future player must also
condition upon this event. Thus such conditioning is possible in equilibrium
only if the strategy prole exhibits innite history dependence. We thus give
the most general version of an argument rst laid out by Bhaskar (1998) in
the context of a particular (social security) overlapping generations game.
This argument does not apply with simultaneous moves since two players
may mutually reinforce such conditioning at the same instant, as we discuss
in point 5 on page 17.
4One exception is Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2002) who provides a rationale for
Markov equilibria in asynchronous choice games based on complexity costs.
5In a dierent context (repeated games with imperfect public monitoring), Mailath and
Morris (2002) and Mailath and Morris (2006) show that strategies based on innite recall
are not \robust to private monitoring," i.e, they cease to constitute equilibrium with even













Figure 1: The stage game for the chain store. The top payo is the payo
to the Entrant.
While perfect information games are special, many economic models fall
within the class of this paper, as noted brie
y in the abstract and discussed
at length on page 7. In any case, the modeling choice between treating dy-
namic interactions as repeated simultaneous move games or repeated asyn-
chronous move games is often made for tractability and transparency. As
argued by Rubinstein (1991), some of our modeling choices should be un-
derstood as capturing players' understanding of their situation rather than
a literal description of the environment. Our results highlight that boot-
strapping payo irrelevant information into non-Markovian folk theorems is
sensitive to how the game is played.
2 A Long-Run Short-Run Player Example
Consider the following example of a repeated perfect information game, the
chain store game, played between a long run player and an innite sequence
of short-run players. In each period, an entrant (the short run player) must
decide whether to enter or stay out. If the entrant stays out, the stage game
ends; if he enters, then the incumbent (the long run player) must decide
whether to accommodate or ght. The stage game is depicted in Figure
1. The short run player maximizes his stage game payo while the long
run player maximizes the discounted sum of payos with discount factor 
which is less than but close to 1. Let us assume that the short-run playerFoundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 4
only observes and thus can only condition on what happened in the last
period. The long run player has observes the entire history. We will require
equilibria to satisfy sequential rationality { each player must be choosing
optimally at every possible history.
Ahn (1997, Chapter 3) has studied this type of game, and shows that for
generic values of the discount factor, there is no pure strategy equilibrium
where entry is deterred. To provide some intuition, restrict attention to
stationary strategies. Since the entrant only observes the outcome of the
previous period, the entrant's history is an element of H = fOUT;A;Fg.
Consider a trigger strategy type equilibrium where the entrant enters after
accommodation in the previous period, and stays out otherwise. For this
to be optimal, the incumbent must play a strategy of the form: F as long
as he had not played A; A otherwise. Such a strategy is not sequentially
rational, because it is not optimal to play A when A had been played in the
previous period. For in this case, playing A secures a payo of zero, while
a one step deviation to F earns  (1   )c + , which is strictly positive for
high enough .
There are however mixed strategy equilibria where entry is deterred in
each period. One such equilibrium has the incumbent playing F with prob-
ability 1
2, independent of history. The entrant is indierent between IN and
OUT at any information set, given incumbent's strategy. He plays OUT at
t = 1: At t > 1 he plays OUT after at 1 2 fOUT;Fg; if at 1 = A, he plays
IN with probability q = (1    + (1   )c)=(1   2 + (1   )c), where q
was chosen to make the incumbent indierent between accommodating and
ghting. In this equilibrium, the entrant's beliefs about the incumbent's
response is identical after the two one-period histories A and fOUT;Fg.
Nevertheless, the entrant plays dierently.
We now establish that this mixed strategy equilibrium cannot be puried
if we add small shocks to the game's payos. So suppose that the entrant gets
a payo shock "~ zt
1 from choosing OUT while the incumbent gets a payo
shock "~ zt
2 from choosing F. We suppose each z2
i is drawn independently
across players and across time according to some known density with support
[0;1]. The shocks are observed only by the player making the choice at the
time he is about to make it. A strategy for the entrant is
t : fOUT;A;Fg  [0;1] ! (A1),
while a strategy for the incumbent is
t : Ht  [0;1] ! (A2)Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 5
(in principle, it could depend condition on history of past payo shocks, but
this turns out to not matter). Note that t+1 does not condition on what
happened at t   1. Fix a history ht = (h1;h2;:::;ht) 2 Ht with ht = IN
(entry at date t) and zt
2 (payo realization for incumbent). For almost all
zt
















for almost all zt
2. So the incumbent does not condition on ht 1. Now the
entrant at t also has a payo shock. Since the incumbent does not condition
on ht 1,
t(ht 1;zt
1) = t(~ ht 1;zt
1)
for almost all zt
1.
We conclude that for any " > 0, only equilibria in Markov strategies
exist. In this context, this implies that the backwards induction outcome of
stage game must be played in every period.
3 The Model
3.1 The Perfect Information Game
We consider an innite dynamic game of perfect information,  : The game
has a recursive structure and may also have public moves by nature. The
set of players is denoted by N and the set of states by S, both of which
are countable. Only one player can move at any state, and we denote the
assignment of players to states by  : S ! N. This assignment induces
a partition fS(i) j i 2 Ng of S, where S(i) = fs 2 S j (s) = ig is the
set of states at which i moves. Let A denote the countable set of actions
available at any state; since payos are state dependent, it is without loss
of generality to assume that the set of actions is state independent. Let
q (s0js;a) denote the probability of state s0 following state s when action a is
played; thus q : S  A ! (S). The initial distribution over states is given
by q(?). Player i has bounded 
ow payo ui : S  A ! R and a discount
factor i 2 [0;1): Total payos in the game are the discounted sum of 
ow





The game starts in a state s0 at period 0 determined by q(?) and the
history at period t  1 is a sequence of states and actions, Ht = (S  A)t.
Some histories may not be feasible: if after a history h = (s;a)t
=0, the
state s has zero probability under q( j st;at), then that state cannot ariseFoundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 6
after the history h. Since infeasible histories arise with zero probability and
the set of all histories is countable, without loss of generality our notation
often ignores the possibility of infeasible histories. Let H0 = f?g and H =
[1
t=0Ht; we write h for a typical element of H,  (h) for the length of the
history (i.e.,  (h) is the t for which h 2 Ht), and H1 = (S  A)
1 for the
set of outcomes (innite histories) with typical element h1. We sometimes
write (h;s) for (h;s(h)) = (s0;a0;s1;a1;:::;s(h) 1;a(h) 1;s(h)), with the
understanding that s = s(h). Player i's payo as a function of outcome,
Ui : H1 ! R, is
Ui (h1) = Ui ((st;at)
1





A (behavioral) strategy for player i is a mapping bi : H  S(i) ! (A).
Write Bi for the set of strategies of player i: A strategy prole b = (bi)i2N
can be understood as a mapping b : H  S ! (A), specifying a mixed
action at every history. Write Vi (b j h;s) for player i's expected continuation
utility from the strategy prole b at the history (h;s). This value is given
recursively by
Vi (b j h;s) =
X
a2A
b(s) (a j h;s)
(













We write Vi (b) 
P
q(s j ?)Vi (bj(?;s)) for player i's ex ante utility under
strategy prole b.
Denition 1 A strategy bi is Markovian if for each s 2 S(i) and histories
h;h0 2 H of the same length (i.e., (h) = (h0)),
bi(h;s) = bi(h0;s):
A Markovian strategy is stationary if the two histories can be of dierent
lengths.
Remark 1 (Markov strategies) In this denition, we have taken the no-
tion of Markovian strategy as a primitive. The restriction to Markov strate-
gies is often motivated by the desire to restrict behavior to only depend
on the payo relevant aspects of history. Maskin and Tirole (2001) deneFoundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 7
a payo relevant partition over (same length) histories using payo rele-
vance,6 and identify elements of the partition with Markov states. While in
general the payo relevant partition is coarser than the partition induced
by the states S, a sucient condition for the two partitions to agree is that
for every pair of states s;s0 2 S(i), ui(s;a) is not an ane transformation
of ui(s0;a) (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, Proposition 5.6.2).7

Denition 2 Strategy prole b is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)
if, for all s 2 S, h 2 H, and each i 2 N and b0
i 2 Bi,
Vi((bi;b i) j h;s)  Vi((b0
i;b i) j h;s): (1)
If b is both Markovian and a SPNE, it is said to be a Markov equilibrium.
Many games t into our general setting. Repeated perfect information
game (e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1995), Takahashi (2005)) t: the state
w tracks where you are in the perfect information stage game; ui(wt;at) is
zero whenever (wt;at) results in a non-terminal node of the stage game,
and is the payo at the terminal node otherwise. Stochastic games where
players move sequentially also t: now the state w would stand either for
a node in the perfect information game, or the initial node of one of the
perfect information games. Doraszelski and Judd (2007) argue that this
class of games is computationally tractable and important. A nite game
of perfect information also ts: we simply add a terminal state. Perfect
information games played between overlapping generations of players are an
example (Kandori (1992), Bhaskar (1998) and Muthoo and Shepsle (2006)).
Extensive form games between long run and short run players, as studied in
the reputation literature, t naturally (e.g. Fudenberg and Levine (1989);
Ahn (1997, Chapter 3)). A literature examines innitely repeated games
with asynchronous moves, either with a deterministic order of moves (as in
Maskin and Tirole (1987, 1988a,b), Laguno and Matsui (1997) and Bhaskar
and Vega-Redondo (2002)) or with a random order of moves (as in Matsui
and Matsuyama (1995)).8 In both cases, the state is the prole of actions
6Loosely, the desired partition is the coarsest partition with the property that to every
prole measurable with respect to that partition, each player has a best response measur-
able with respect to that partition.
7Maskin and Tirole (2001) use cardinal preferences to determine payo equivalence,
and hence the presence of ane transformations.
8To incorporate the Poisson process of opportunities to change actions, as in Matsui
and Matsuyama (1995), we would have to incorporate a richer timing structure into our
model. But the extension would be inessential.Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 8
c1 c2 d
c1 11;11 6;9  20;20
c2 9;6 10;10  20;20
d 20; 20 20; 20 0;0
Figure 2: Payos for an augmented prisoner's dilemma.
of players whose actions are xed, and ui(wt;at) is the stage game payo.
Canonical non-cooperative model of bargaining where, in each period, one
proposer makes an oer and other players decide sequentially whether to
accept or reject the oer also t, with both deterministic order of moves
(Rubinstein (1982)) and random order (Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sen-
gupta (1993)).
Example 1 (An asynchronous move example) Consider the augmented
prisoners' dilemma illustrated in Figure 2. With asynchronous moves, player
1 moves in odd periods and player 2 in even periods (since time begins at
t = 0, player 2 makes the rst move). State and action sets are S = A =
fc1;c2;dg.
Suppose the initial state is given by c1. The game admits multiple sta-
tionary Markov perfect equilibria, as well as nonstationary Markov perfect
equilibria.
There are two stationary pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria: Let
b : S ! A be the Markov strategy given by b(s) = s. It is straightforward





. Let by : S ! A
be the Markov strategy given by by(c1) = by(c2) = c2 and by(d) = d. It is






Finally, denote by b : S ! (A) the Markov strategy given by b(c1) =
c1+(1 )c2, b(c2) = c2, and b(d) = d. Suppose it is player i's turn.
At (h;c2), the payo from following b is
Vi(b j h;c2) = 10: (2)
At (h;c1), the payo from choosing c1, and then following b, is
(1   )11 + f(1   )11 + Vi(b j (h;c1;c1);c1)g
+ (1   )f(1   )6 + Vi(b j (h;c1;c1);c2)g; (3)
while the payo from choosing c2, and then following b, is
(1   )9 + Vi(b j (h;c1);c2)g: (4)Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 9
In order for player i to be willing to randomize, (3) must equal (4), with
this common values being Vi(b j h;c1). Since Vi(b j (h;c1);c2) = 10, (4)





This is a well dened probability for   1
2. Moreover, b, for  satisfying






For any time t, the nonstationary Markov strategy specifying for periods
before or at t, play according to b, and for periods after t, play according




3.2 The Perturbed Game
We now allow for the payos in the underlying game to be perturbed, as
in Harsanyi (1973). We require that the payo perturbations respect the
recursive payo structure of the innite horizon game, i.e., to not depend
upon history except via the state: Let Z be a full dimensional compact
subset of RjAj and write  (Z) for the set of measures with support Z
generated by strictly positive densities.9 At each history (h;s), a payo
perturbation z 2 Z is independently drawn according to s 2 (Z). The
payo perturbation is observed by only (s), i.e., the player moving at s. If
this player chooses action a, his payo is augmented by "za, where " > 0.
Thus players' stage payos in the perturbed game depend only on the current
state, action and payo perturbation (s;a;z) and are given by
~ ui (s;a;z) =
(
ui (s;a) + "za; if i = (s);
ui (s;a); otherwise:
We denote the perturbed game by  (";).
To describe strategies, we rst describe players' information more pre-
cisely. Write Ti(h;s) for the collection of periods at which player i moved
(and thus observed a payo perturbation), i.e.,
Ti(h;s)  fk 2 f0;1;:::;(h)g j (sk) = ig:
9Our analysis only requires that the support be in Z, but notation is considerably
simplied by assuming Z is the support.Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 10
At the public history (h;s), in the perturbed game player i = (s) has private
information
zTi(h;s)  (zk)k2Ti(h;s) 2 ZTi(h;s):
A behavior strategy for player i in the perturbed game, ~ bi, species player
i's mixed action ~ bi(h;s;zTi(h;s)), at every history (h;s) with s 2 S(i) and for
every realization of i's payo perturbations zTi(h;s). The set of all behavior
strategies for player i is denoted ~ Bi.
A vector of realized payo perturbations is written z, with the dimension
implied by context. Thus, z = (zTi(h;s))n
i=1 is the vector of all realized payo
perturbations at the history (h;s) .
The denition of sequential rationality requires us to have notation to





for the set of dates at which player i does not observe the payo pertur-
bations. A belief assessment for player i species, for every feasible history








over the payo perturbations zT i(h;s) that have been observed by other
players at history (h;s). Note that, as suggested by the structure of the
perturbed game, we require that these beliefs are independent of player i's
private payo perturbations, zTi(h;s); beyond this requirement, we impose no
further restrictions (such as that the payo shocks are independent across
the other players or periods)|see Remark 2.
Player i's \value" function is recursively given by, for a given strategy
prole ~ b,















Since player i does not know all the coordinates of z, player i's expected
payo from the prole ~ b is given by
Z
~ Vi(~ b j h;s;(zTi(h;s);zT i(h;s))) 
h;s
i (dzT i(h;s)): (7)Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 11
Denition 3 Strategy ~ bi is a sequential best response to (~ b i;i), if for each
h 2 H, s 2 S(i), zTi(h;s) 2 ZTi(h;s), and ~ b0
i 2 ~ Bi,
Z






i;~ b i) j h;s;(zTi(h;s);zT i(h;s))) 
h;s
i (dzT i(h;s)):
Strategy ~ bi is a sequential best response to ~ b i if strategy ~ bi is a sequential
best response to (~ b i;i) for some i.
Denition 4 A strategy ~ bi is shock history independent if for all h 2 H,
s 2 S(i), and shock histories zTi(h;s); ^ zTi(h;s) 2 ZTi(h;s),
~ bi(h;s;zTi(h;s)) = ~ bi(h;s; ^ zTi(h0;s)); a.a. z 2 Z;
whenever z(h) = ^ z(h).
Lemma 1 If ~ bi is a sequential best response to any ~ b i, then ~ bi is a shock
history independent strategy.
Proof. Fix a player i, h 2 H, w 2 Wi and payo perturbation history
zTi(h;s) with z(h) = z. Player i's next period expected continuation payo











Since ~ b i and 
h;s0
i do not depend on player i's shocks before period (h),
zTi(h;s), the maximization implies that Vi(a;~ b i;i j h;s) also does not
depend on those shocks. Thus, his total utility is
(1   i)[ui(s;a) + "za] + iVi(a;~ b i;i j h;s):
Since Z has full dimension and s is absolutely continuous, player i can
only be indierent between two actions a and a0 for a zero measure set of
z 2 Z. For other z, there is a unique best response, and so it is shock history
independent.
A shock history independent strategy (ignoring realization of z of mea-
sure 0) can be written as
~ bi : H  S(i)  Z ! (A):Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 12
If all players are following shock history independent strategies, we can
recursively dene value functions for a given strategy prole ~ b that do not
depend on any payo shock realizations:
V 
i (~ b j h;s) =
Z X
a2A
~ b(s)(a j h;s;z)
"




q(s0 j s;a)V 
i (~ b j (h;s;a);s0)
#
s(dz): (8)
It is now immediate from Lemma 1 that beliefs over unreached informa-
tion sets are essentially irrelevant in the notion of sequential best responses,
because, while behavior can in principle depend upon prior payo shocks,
optimal behavior does not.
Lemma 2 A prole ~ b is a prole of mutual sequential best responses if,
and only if, for all i, ~ bi is shock history independent, and for each h 2 H,
s 2 S(i) and ~ b0
i 2 ~ Bi,
V 
i ((~ bi;~ b i) j h;s)  V 
i ((~ b0
i;~ b i) j h;s): (9)
Remark 2 Because the perturbed game has a continuum of possible payo
shocks in each period, and players may have sequences of unreached infor-
mation sets, there is no standard solution concept that we may appeal to.
Our notion of sequential best response is very weak (not even requiring that
the beliefs respect Bayes' rule on the path of play). The only requirement is
that each player's beliefs over other players' payo shocks be independent
of that player's shocks. For information sets on the path of play, this re-
quirement is implied by Bayes' rule. Tremble-based renements imply such
a requirement at all information sets, though they may imply additional
restrictions across information sets. This requirement is not implied by the
notion of \weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium" from Mas-Colell, Whinston,
and Green (1995), where no restrictions are placed on beliefs o the equi-
librium path: this would allow players to have dierent beliefs about past
payo perturbations depending on their realized current payo realization.
However, Lemma 2 implies that once we impose mutuality of sequential
best responses, any additional restrictions have no restrictive power. It is
worth noting why no belief assessment 
h;s
i appears either in the description
of V 
i , (8), or in Lemma 2: Player i's expected payo from the prole ~ b, given
in (7), is the expectation over past payo shocks of other players, zT i(h;s),Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 13
as well as all future payo shocks. Critically, in this expectation, as implied
by the structure of the perturbed game, it is assumed that all future shocks
are distributed according to , and are independent of all past shocks.

Given Lemma 2 and the discussion in Remark 2, the following denition
is natural:
Denition 5 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a prole of mutual sequen-
tial best responses.
The denition of Markovian shock history independent strategies natu-
rally generalizes that for the unperturbed game: a strategy ~ bi is Markovian
if for each s 2 S(i), for almost all z 2 Z, and histories h;h0 2 H with
(h) = (h0),
~ bi(h;s;z) = ~ bi(h0;s;z):
Denition 6 A shock history independent strategy ~ bi has K-recall if for
each s 2 S(i), histories h;h0 2 H satisfying (h) = (h0) = t, and almost
all z 2 Z,
~ bi(h;s;z) = ~ bi(h0;s;z)
whenever (sk;ak)t 1
k=t K = (sk;ak)t 1
k=t K. A strategy bi has innite recall
if it does not have K-recall for any K. A Markovian strategy is a 0-recall
strategy (there being no restriction on h and h0).
A K-recall strategy is stationary if the two histories can be of dierent
lengths.
The following is the key result of the paper.
Lemma 3 If ~ bi is a sequential best response to ~ b i and does not have K-
recall, then for some j 6= i, ~ bj does not have (K + 1)-recall.
Proof. If ~ bi does not have K-recall, then there exist h and h0 with












for a positive measure of z.Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 14
Suppose that ~ bj has (K +1)-recall for each j 6= i. Since histories (h;s;a)
and (h0;s;a) agree in the last K + 1 periods, player i's continuation value
from playing action a at (h;s) and at (h0;s) is the same, for all s0:
V 
i ((~ bi;~ b i) j (h;s;a);s0): = V 
i ((~ bi;~ b i) j (h0;s;a);s0):
Hence, player i's total expected utility from choosing action a at either (h;s)
or (h0;s) is
(1   i)~ ui(s;a;z) + i
X
s02S
q(s0 j s;a)V 
i ((~ bi;~ b i) j (h;s;a);s0):
For almost all z, there will be a unique a maximizing this expression, con-
tradicting our premise (10).
Corollary 1 If ~ b is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the perturbed game,
then either ~ b is Markovian or at least two players have innite recall.
3.3 Purication in the Games of Perfect Information
We now consider the puriability of rationalizable strategies in the unper-
turbed game. Fix a strategy prole b of the unperturbed game. We say
that a sequence of current shock strategies ~ bk
i in the perturbed game con-
verges to a strategy bi in the unperturbed game if expected behavior (taking
expectations over shocks) converges, i.e., for each h 2 H, s 2 Si and a 2 A,
Z
~ bk
i (a j h;s;z)s(dz) ! bi(a j h;s)
Denition 7 The strategy prole b is puriable if there exists  : S !
(Z) and "k ! 0, such that there is a sequence of proles f~ bkg1
k=1 con-
verging to b, with ~ bk a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the perturbed game
 (;"k) for each k.
We immediately have the following:
Proposition 1 If b is a puriable SPNE in which no more than one player
has innite recall, then b is Markovian.Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 15
4 Discussion
1. PURIFIABILITY OF MARKOV EQUILIBRIA. All Markovian equi-
libria are puriable: we can simply pick the noise distribution to sup-
port exactly the Markov behavioral strategy we are purifying.
We expect suitably regular Markov equilibria to satisfy stronger puri-
ability properties. It is worth noting that|if we are allowed enough
freedom in picking the noise|we can purify anything without any
regularity arguments.
To make this precise, we proceed as follows: We restrict attention to
nite (N) players and nite states; and generalize the payo pertur-
bation so that each player gets a payo perturbation as each decision
node, so  : S ! (ZN). We also weaken the notion of purication,
allowing the distribution  to depend on k.
Denition 8 The strategy prole b is weakly puriable if there exists
"k ! 0 and, for each k, k : S ! (ZN), such that there is a
sequence of proles f~ bkg1
k=1 converging to b, with ~ bk a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the perturbed game  (;"k) for each k.
Claim 1 Suppose there is a nite number of players, N, and S is
nite. Every Markov equilibrium in the unperturbed game is weakly
puriable.
SKETCH OF PROOF.
Let b : S ! (A) be any Markov equilibrium of the unperturbed
game. Write A (s) for the set of actions that are best responses
(perhaps weak best responses) at state s. Fix a sequence of Markov
strategy proles bk such that bk ! b (i.e., bk (a j s) ! b(a j s) for each
a and s) with the support of bk ( j s) equal to A (s).
Write Vi (b0 j s) for the expected payo to player i from b0 in the un-
perturbed game starting in state s. Recall that Z, a full dimensional
compact subset of RA, is the support of the payo shocks. Let's make
the normalization that the 0 vector is in the interior of Z. For each ac-
tion a, write Z (a;s) for the collection of payo shock proles favoring





(s) for all a0 2 A (s), a0 6= a
o
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Note that the union of the closures of the sets (Z (a;s))a2A is ZN,
i.e.,
[a2Acl(Z (a;s)) = ZN.
Write a (z;s) for the action satisfying z 2 Z(a;s). (Such an action
is unique for almost all z, choose arbitrarily when it is not unique.)
For each s 2 S and k, set
k




b(a j s)   bk (a j s)

ui (s;a)
Now choose "k 2 R+ and k (s) 2 
 
ZN










and, for each a 2 A (s)
Pr
k(s)
(Z (a;s)) = bk (ajs).
(I assert that this is feasible; is this obvious?). Since bk ! b we








1, if z 2 Z (a;s)
0, if z 2 Z (a0;s), for any a0 2 A (s), a0 6= a
It does not matter what e b does on the (zero measure) boundaries of
the sets Z (a;s). I claim this is a PBE of the perturbed game (i.e.,
each e bk
i is a sequential best response to e bk
 i) and that e bk converges to
b.
2. EXISTENCE OF MARKOV EQUILIBRIA. A large literature ad-
dresses the question of existence of Markov equilibria: see Due, Geanako-
plos, Mas-Colell, and McClennan (1994), Escobar (2008) and Doraszel-
ski and Escobar (2008).
3. UNIQUENESS OF MARKOV EQUILIBRIA. There will often be mul-
tiple Markov equilibria in our class of games: see, for example, Maskin
and Tirole (1988a). But this multiplicity of Markov equilibria does not
allow us to sustain any additional outcomes.Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 17
4. HARSANYI PURIFICATION. "Purication" has had two multiple
meanings in the literature (see Morris (2008)). One question asked in
the literature is when can we guarantee that there exists an essentially
pure equilibrium in a game by adding noise to payos (e.g., Radner
and Rosenthal (1982)). It is trivially true that our perturbation en-
sures that there is an essentially pure equilibrium (we build in enough
independence to guarantee that this is the case). We follow Harsanyi
(1973) in being interested in the relation between equilibria of the
unperturbed game and equilibria of the perturbed game. But our def-
inition of \puriability" is very weak: we require only that there exists
a sequence of equilibria of a sequence perturbed games that converge
to the desired behavior. Harsanyi (1973) showed (for static games)
the much stronger that (under some regularity conditions) every equi-
librium was the limit of a sequence of equilibria in every sequence
of perturbed games. This suggests a stronger denition of puria-
bility in our context. Strategy prole b is Harsanyi puriable if, for
every  : S ! M and "k ! 0, the
 
;"k1
k=1 perturbed games have
a sequence of strategy proles ~ bk converging to b, with ~ bk
i a sequen-




for each i. We conjecture that
with additional regularity assumptions, Markovian equilibria will be
Harsanyi puriable: Doraszelski and Escobar (2008) provided condi-
tions for the Harsanyi puriability of Markovian equilibria; while their
class of games they study do not encompass those in the present paper,
it seems possible to extend their results.
5. SIMULTANEOUS MOVES. Our results do not extend to games where
more than one player moves at a time, e.g. repeated synchronous move
games. Mailath and Morris (2002) and Mailath and Olszewski (2008)
give examples of nite recall strategy proles which are strict and
therefor puriable. In this context, one might conjecture a weaker
result that puriability would rule out the \belief-free" strategies de-
veloped is the recent literature (Piccione (2002), Ely and V alim aki
(2002) and Ely, H orner, and Olszewski (2005)). Bhaskar, Mailath,
and Morris (2008) show that the one period recall strategies of Ely
and V alim aki (2002) are puriable via one period recall strategies in
the perturbed game; however, they are puriable via innite recall
strategies. The puriability of such belief free strategies via nite re-
call strategies remains an open question.
6. ENDOGENOUS IDENTIFICATION OF MARKOVIAN STRUCTURE.Foundation for Markov Equilibria; March 5, 2009 18
We constructed a game where the publicly observed state w was a suf-
cient statistic for everything payo relevant in the game. Maskin
and Tirole (2001) describe how one can identify the coarsest possible
description of a state that is sucient statistic for payo relevance in
the continuation. If the game we were studying turned out to have a
courser payo relevant, our arguments in favor of Markov perfection
would apply to that coarser state space also.
7. INESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE MODELLING. A number of
simplifying assumptions were made in our formulation to lighten the
notation, and could easily be relaxed. There is no need to have the
same support for the noise in dierent states. The length of time
between moves could be random (for example, re
ecting a Poisson
process of arrival of revision opportunities). Our model could easily
be enriched to allow for this.
8. TECHNOLOGICAL RESTRICTION ON MEMORY. We maintained
the assumption of perfect information in our formal analysis. In many
applications, such as those discussed on page 3.1, it is natural to as-
sume that some players observe only a nite history of play. This will
(technologically) rule out equilibria with innite memory. In princi-
ple, allowing imperfect observation of play could create nite memory
equilibria that would not have been equilibria with innite memory.
However, the arguments that we presented apply also if players have
restricted memory.
9. RATIONALIZABILITY. Our argument was stated for equilibrium,
but could be extended to apply to versions of rationalizability for this
class of games that maintained sequential rationality and the key fea-
ture that players' beliefs about other players' past payo shocks were
not correlated with their current payo shocks.
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